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COMPULSORY INSURANCE RATING
Antitrust--Insurance-Compulsory Rating Bureaus
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier,1 North Carolina's statutory scheme
requiring all insurance companies selling automobile liability insur-
ance to adhere to state rates initiated by a compulsory rating bureau
was upheld.2 Plaintiffs, five large insurance companies doing twenty-
nine percent of the total business in North Carolina, argued that
because the North Carolina statute restricted competition by pro-
hibiting lower premium rates, the statute had been pre-empted by
the Sherman Acte and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.'
In 1869 in Paul v. Virginia5 the United States Supreme Court
held that the business of insurance was not commerce and subse-
quent decisions were consistent with this holding. Thus, insurance
was not subject to congressional control under the commerce clause
and consequently, the states regulated and taxed the business.' But
in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n,7 where there
was concerted action and an agreement which fixed rates and com-
missions of agents, boycotts to coerce non-members to join
-361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
'For the entire scheme, see N.C. GN. STAT. §§ 58-246 to -248.8 (1965),
as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248 (Supp. 1965). Specific provisions un-
der attack in the principal case are N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-247 (1965) (mem-
bership in a bureau a prerequisite to writing automobile liability insurance)
and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.2 (1965) (forbidding issuance of rates not
in conformity with rates made and filed by the rating bureau, but allowing
for the charging of a higher rate if such rate is charged with the knowl-
edge and written consent of both the insured and the Commissioner). Other
significant sections are N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248 (Supp. 1965) (providing
for approval or disapproval of the proposed rates from the compulsory bureau
by the insurance commissioner within ninety days after submission) and
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (Supp. 1957) (requiring automobile liability
insurance as a prerequisite to registration).
826 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
'59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964).
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). Later cases were New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 (1913); Hooper v. California, 155
U.S. 648 (1895). See generally SAwYER, IN SURANCE AS INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE (1945), [hereinafter cited as SAwYER]; Powell, Insurance as Coin-
merce, 57 HARv. L. Rnv. 937 (1944).
'Although in 1944 there was state statutory regulation of rate-making
in two-thirds of the states, private rate-making was not really effectively
controlled. Kimball & Boyce, The Adequacy of State Inisurance Regulation:
The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical Perspective, 56 Mica. L. REv.
545, 546-52 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Kimball & Boyce]. See also
SAWYER at 38-40.
'322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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S.E.U.A., and control of ninety per cent of fire and "allied" lines,
the United States Supreme Court held that insurance was subject
to federal control under the commerce clause, noting that: "No
commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across
state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power
of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an ex-
ception of the business of insurance."" However, the court found
a more flexible conception of federal-state relationship than was
present in Paul v. Virginia because the federal regulation (the Sher-
man Act) did not exclude state regulation? The court said: "The
argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidates many states
laws regulating insurance we regard as exaggerated. Few states go
so far as to permit private insurance companies, without state super-
vision, to agree upon and fix uniform insurance rates." 10
Nevertheless, many feared that the foundations of state regula-
tory and taxing systems had been shaken, 1 notwithstanding a state-
ment to the contrary by Attorney General Biddle. 2 Specifically, in-
surance men feared that state regulation that permitted rate-making
would be declared invalid because in conflict with the Sherman Act;
and state officials feared the invalidity of taxes as a burden on inter-
state commerce.'3  This fear was ill-founded because Gibbons v.
OgdenI'4 had held that state regulation of interstate activities was
not proscribed by the commerce clause standing alone, but only when
Congress had acted pursuant to the commerce clause. But much
confusion was evident about the status of insurance regulation and
insurance companies pressed for congressional legislation that would
exempt insurance from federal antitrust laws and authorize con-
tinued state regulation.
8 Id. at 553.
' See Note, 44 CoLum. L. REv. 772, 777 (1944).10 322 U.S. at 562.
"See Note, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1088 (1962).
12 90 CONG. REc. A3359, A3360 (1944).
IS See Kimball & Boyce at 553-54. For the specific reasons given by
insurance people that state laws should remain effective, see Dirlam &
Stelzer, The Insurance Industry: A Case Study in the Workability of Regu-
lated Competition, 107 U. PA. L. Rv. 199, 201-02 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as Dirlam & Stelzer].
1,22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Later, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that as long as Congress had not pre-empted a field, the states were
free to regulate. Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946). The
Robertson case upheld state regulation of unadmitted insurers and unlicensed
agents. The court held that state power to regulate insurance did not depend
on the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
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To clarify matters and to insure the existence of state laws
which regulate insurance, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, 5 a compromise between those who wanted Congress explicitly
to overrule the South-Eastern decision and those who felt that Con-
gress and the states could adjust to the situation with appropriate
legislation. 6 Clearly, the purpose of the act was to plot the bound-
aries between state and federal regulation of insurance.'7 Its stated
purpose was that the "continued regulation and taxation by the
several states of the business of insurance is in the public inter-
est . . ."" and, therefore, insurance "shall be subject to the laws of
the several states. . . ."I" A three year moratorium was declared to
enable the states to enact legislation regulating insurance.
20
Sections 2(b) and 3(b) draw the boundary: the former pro-
vides that the "Sherman Act ... shall be applicable to the business
of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law";"1 the latter provides that "nothing contained in this
chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agree-
ment to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or
intimidation."22
Section 3(b) appears to be the result of congressional fears
that the practices revealed in South-Eastern would arise again, al-
though clearly, the Sherman Act would already be applicable under
the South-Eastern decision since no question of state regulation was
present in that case. Justice Black, speaking for the court, said, in
reference to existing state regulation: "No states authorize combi-
nations of insurance companies to coerce, intimidate and boycott
competitors and consumers in the manner here alleged .... 23 The
language of section 3 (b) appears to incorporate Black's language.
15 See Note, 46 MINN. L. Rv. 1088, 1090 (1962) citing 23 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 317 (1945) for a detailed history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
" See 91 CONG. REc. 1480-81 (1945).
" Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 85 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
1s 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1964).
" 61 Stat. 448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1964).
2061 Stat. 448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 1013(a) (1964). United States v.
Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956) held that the Sherman
Act was applicable during the moratorium.
2161 Stat. 448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1964).
22 61 Stat. 448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1964). There is no lack of
precedent for this "exemption" from antitrust. For a listing of statutory
exemptions from federal antitrust laws, see PHILLIPS, PEaSPECTIVES ON
ANTITRUST POLIcY 301-11 (1965).
23 322 U.S. at 562.
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Any attempt to apply the Sherman Act to the business of insurance
must, therefore, be justified by the absence of state regulation or
the existence of abuses enumerated in 3(b).
In the principal case the plaintiffs did not argue that the Sher-
man Act had been violated by North Carolina or that the state
had not regulated the business of insurance, but that the North
Carolina regulatory scheme had been pre-empted by section 3 (b) of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The reason for this argument is clear.
In Parker v. Brown the United States Supreme Court said:
We may assume for present purposes that the California prorate
program, [the regulatory scheme in question], would violate the
Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely by
virtue of a contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons,
individual or corporate .... The state in adopting and enforcing
the prorate program made no contract or agreement and entered
into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly
but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government
which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit24
Specifically, this has been interpreted to mean that the Sherman Act
does not apply to state regulation of insurance. 5 Thus, plaintiffs
argued that Parker could be distinguished from the principal case in
that, while in Parker there was an attempted application of antitrust
laws to the state activity in question, here was a pre-emption of state
law because of a violation of section 3(b) of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act.2" In other words, section 3(b) denotes a limitation on
the Parker v. Brown doctrine by making the Sherman Act pre-emi-
nent in areas of boycotts, coercions, intimidations, even where the
state had regulated.
Whether there has been a pre-emption depends upon congres-
sional intent. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that section 2(b) stand-
" 317 U.S. 341, 350, 352 (1943).
"See, e.g., Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 299
(D. Mass. 1957), aff'd 2nein., 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 828 (1957); North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal
Exch., 85 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Ark. 1949), aff'd, 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950); Insurance Co. of North America
v. Insurance Comm'n, 237 Miss. 759, 116 So. 2d 224 (1959).
"8 (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs further noted that the regulation in
Parker actually conformed to the federal Agricultural Marketing Act of
1937 and the dispute was therefore between two federal statutes; thus, the
case did not involve a federal-state conflict as is present in the principal
case. Brief for Appellants, pp. 34-38, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d
870 (4th Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 45
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ing alone would give states carte blanche to regulate without fear
of federal antitrust application. But section 2(b) is limited by sec-
tion 3(b) which asserts the supremacy of the Sherman Act where
there is "coerced" restraint of trade, whether private or state, be-
cause unless this is so, the langauge of the act is redundant since
antitrust legislation is already applicable under section 2(b) to the
extent the state has not undertaken regulation. Thus, section 3 (b)
denotes something further, pre-emption of state laws which estab-
lish "coercion" in restraint of trade.17 North Carolina contended
that the two sections do not conflict; state regulation operates as a
substitute for the Sherman Act, except that it is always applicable
to private boycott, coercion, etc., not to "state coercion" because
Congress did not intend to create a new area of Sherman Act appli-
cation beyond Parker v. Brown.2
The court in the principal case rejected plaintiffs argument:
2 Evidences of this congressional intent are the following:
I take it that the Senator is apprehensive lest a statute by a State
attempting to give validity to a private agreement to regulate would
be recognized under [Parker v. Brown] . . . I have no doubt in my
own mind that no State... could give authority to violate the Sher-
man antitrust law.
91 CONG. REc. 1480 (1945).
Nothing in this bill is to be so construed as indicating it to be the
intent or desire of Congress to require or encourage the several
States to enact legislation that would make it compulsory for any
Insurance company to become a member of rating bureaus or charge
uniform rates. It is the opinion of Congress that competitive rates
on a sound financial basis are in the public interest.
H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
Plaintiffs also point out that Congress did not establish compulsory
rating bureaus for the District of Columbia. Brief for Appellants, pp. 26-27,
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966). For the general
argument of the plaintiffs, see Bergson, Regulation v. Competition, 1956 INs.
LJ 703, 706-07.
"8 Evidences of this congressional intent are the following: "The anti-
trust laws do not conflict with affirmative regulation of insurance by the
States such as agreed insurance rates if they are affirmatively approved by
State officials." 91 CONG. REc. 1479 (1945) (President Roosevelt writing
to Senator Radcliffe, quoted by Senator Pepper).
A state law relating to taxation, a law relating to regulation, for
insurance, the fixing of rates, or the fixing of the terms of a contract
of insurance, which might under some definition of monopoly be
monopolistic, would be permitted under the pending bill; but if the
State undertook to authorize a boycott, a coercion, or an intimida-
tion, or an agreement to do any one of those three things, then it
would be clearly void....
91 CONG. REc. 480-81 (1945) (remarks by Senator Ferguson). Thus, it
appears that North Carolina makes no distinction between private and com-
pulsory bureaus, arguing that Congress intended to allow the states this
discretion, whether or not such later practice might actually be monopolistic.
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[W]e find no merit in the distinction suggested by appellants
between the injunction sought in Parker v. Brown and the decla-
ration of pre-emption sought here. The central question in both
cases is whether a program of regulation established and actively
supervised by a state is subject to the antitrust laws. Absent
congressional action departing from the rule of Parker v. Brown,
the North Carolina statutory plan is clearly valid.
29
The court concluded that nothing in the McCarran-Ferguson Act
or its history suggest a limitation of Parker, that there was no
delegation of sovereign authority to a private group or authoriza-
tion of violations of antitrust laws, and that the purpose of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act was to give full support to then existing
and future systems of regulation.
While the court is correct in holding Parker indistinguishable
from the principal case to the extent that the result hoped to be
reached in both was to make state regulation ineffective, it does not
answer plaintiff's arguments. For example, the court referred to
Senator Ferguson to the effect that a state could institute a rating
bureau, but the question is not a rating bureau per se, but whether
the state can have a compulsory rating bureau with standard rates
allowing no deviation in view of section 3(b). Clearly, Congress
intended to allow state established rating bureaus and to permit
voluntary rate-making among insurance companies. Thus, under the
act, insurance companies can voluntarily join together and agree
upon rates as long as there is no section 3(b) violation and the
state has regulated. 0 Further, subsequent to the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act a large number of the states enacted congressionally ap-
proved "all-industry" bills, which provided for non-compulsory
rating bureaus subject to commissioner approval of rates.3
Perhaps the court was terse because of the more detailed hold-
ing of the district court, but the district court misunderstood plain-
tiffs argument, thinking the suit was an attempted application of
antitrust laws to a state."2 Actually, plaintiffs could have argued that
361 F.2d at 872.See notes 27-28 supra.
See Donovan, Insurance-The Case in Favor of Existing Exemptions
from the Antitrust Laws, 20 FED. BJ. 56, 59-64 (1960). See generally
ZOFF.R, THE HITsRo OF AUTOMOBILE Iws RANcE RATING (1959) [herein-
after cited as ZoFFER].
"The court said: "In effect, the plaintiffs insist the State has committed
a violation of the Sherman Act by establishing such stringent controls upon
the business of insurance as to foreclose competition. They insist the state
[Vol. 45
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North Carolina had not come up to the level of regulation required
to oust federal laws on the grounds that the regulation in question
served no function except to permit anti-competitive activities under
the guise of state control. However, this attack under section 2(b)
would be difficult to prove and would be subject to the Parker
malady already pointed out, i.e., the Sherman Act does not apply to
activities which are controlled and regulated by the state.33 Further,
the courts have shown a reluctance to distinguish between effective
and ineffective regulation. 4
The principal case appears to be the first time this pre-emption
argument has been made. The case is significant because it shows
again the problems the courts have in applying the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act to situations where there is state regulation. The problem is
two-fold: whether regulation under section 2(b) is sufficient to oust
federal laws, and whether state regulation is still valid in light of
the argued pre-emption of section 3(b). The implicit problem is
whether state regulation that is ineffective or actually conducive to
anti-competitive practices is sufficient to oust federal laws which
attempt to maintain competition.
For example, in North Little Rock Trans. Co. v. Casualty Recip-
rocal Exch. 5 the court found that Arkansas had regulated within
the meaning of the act so that federal antitrust laws were not appli-
cable. Here, private rate-making was effective unless affirmatively
disapproved of by the state insurance department. Although evi-
dence of this practice does not of itself show that it was anti-com-
petitive, plaintiffs were not permitted to present evidence that such
was the effect of the regulation."6 It has further been held that
even if a monopoly existed otherwise, if a state regulated, then this
was permissible. In Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,3 7
insurance companies and members of the State Employees' Group
Insurance Commission joined and procured an award of an insur-
is overcontroling the business of insurance." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier,
242 F. Supp. 73, 83 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
" The United States as amicus curiae in the district court insisted the
state had failed to come up to the standard of regulation required by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 83. Clearly, this argument comes under
section 2(b) of the act. The United States did not join this appeal.
" See text following.
"North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 181 F.2d
174 (8th Cir. 1950).
* For a criticism of this case, see Note, 60 YALE L.J. 160 (1951).
3 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1957).
1967]
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ance contract for employees of Massachusetts. The result was that
ninety-five percent of the insurance was allotted to these companies
while the low bid was rejected by the state. Other decisions seem
also to disregard the effects of state regulation and support the posi-
tion taken by the court in the principal case.38
However, there may be some concern over this blanket analy-
sis." In Califorina League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co.4 0 the court held that while an agreement among
defendant companies to fix commission rates could not be attacked
under section 2(b) because the state had regulated (i.e., allowed
co-operation among insurance companies, but not an agreement to
adhere), it was intimated by the court that the activity in question
could be attacked under section 3(b). On subsequent amendment
of the complaint, the same court held that such a regulation did not
displace federal antitrust application, even if such a result did render
the McCarran-Ferguson Act "meaningless" in the price fixing area.4 '
"In a situation analogous to the principal case, a compulsory rating
bureau which allowed no deviation in rates was upheld. The court relied
on Parker and applied the "principle" to the state activity. However, the
argument presented in this case was not pre-emption, but was an attempted
application of antitrust laws. Insurance Co. of North America v. Insurance
Comm'n, 237 Miss. 759, 116 So. 2d 224 (1959). Where a state law pro-
scribed unfair insurance advertising and authorized a scheme of enforce-
ment, the United States Supreme Court has held that nothing in the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act supports the argument that there is a distinction between
regulation and legislation; the legislation in question, even though the argu-
ment was made that the statute had not been crystallized into effective
administrative procedures for application to the individual case, was sufficient
regulation. F.T.C. v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958) (per curiam),
affirming 245 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957).
" In 1959 congressional hearings on this problem, seven senators of a
subcommittee investingating antitrust matters concluded:
It is clear that section 3(b) means that State regulation under . . .
[the McCarran-Ferguson Act] may not abridge the protection from
coercion, boycott, or intimidation afforded by the Sherman Act. The
requirement of several State statutes for mandatory bureau member-
ship substantially lessens competition and appears to be in conflict with
the McCarran Act.... The McCarran Act can certainly not be viewed
as justifying the acts of States in compelling all insurers to be mem-
bers of rating bureaus or requiring that all rates be uniform by
legislative fiat.
S. REP. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 77 (1961). North Carolina's bureau
was singled out as clearly reprehensible to the sentiments of the subcom-
mittee and it was suggested by the subcommittee that the Attorney General
bring an action to test the validity of the bureau.
"175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
't California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 179 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
['Vol. 45
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Other cases have also shown concern over this problem and allowed
antitrust application. 42
Particularly relevant is the language the court used in Monarch
Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co.43 where the court
had found that the state had "regulated": "In passing the McCar-
ran Act, Congress was attempting to return primary responsibility
for insurance regulation to the states; only when a state has not
acted, would federal legislation become effective. Section 3(b), on
the other hand, was designed to exempt certain types of cases from
this general pattern of deference to state regulation; where boycotts,
or agreements to boycott were concerned, the federal policy expressed
through the Sherman Act to be preeminent."44
Rate-making has the dual function of insuring adequacy of the
insurance fund (to pay for the obligations of the insurance policy)
and fairness of premium charges.4 5 North Carolina's scheme fulfills
the former by practically insuring solvency of the insurance com-
panies. But the motorist perhaps pays higher for this protection
than he should. It must be noted that this higher rate does not
mean North Carolina rates are higher than rates in other states, but
that rates perhaps could be lower in North Carolina if the compul-
sory aspect of the regulation were removed. It is common knowl-
edge that rates in North Carolina are lower than surrounding states
and the nation." It may be argued that one factor causing this
lower rate is the fact that jury verdicts of automobile negligence
suits in North Carolina are lower than in states with more urban
population. Moreover, the rates filed are based on pooled loss ex-
perience and the rate agreed upon is likely to protect the less efficient
,42 State regulation that attempted to regulate the insurance companies
extraterritorial activities was considered insufficient to oust federal jurisdic-
tion. FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960), on remand,
298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962). Even though regulation of title insurance
was of the same nature as a particular provision of federal law, this was
not sufficient to oust federal regulation which prevented one title company
from purchasing stock of another title company in order to control the
market. United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (D.C.
IIl. 1965).
" 326 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1963).
"Id. at 844 (dictum).
Kimball & Boyce at 545-46.
'
8 The national average for minimum 5/10/5 liability coverage was$69.70 and North Carolina's average was $50.50 in 1965. South Carolina's
was $58.69 and Tennessee's was $49.92. Many states were well above the
national average. North Carolina Ass'n of Ins. Agents Memo, Feb. 1965,
on file with the North Carolina Law Review.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
member.' This means that the public cannot chose individual cover-
age, but must take "average" coverage through "average" prices or
rates.
As far as the insurance companies themselves are concerned,
they are severely limited in competing, even though they can make
dividend returns and give better service." And the argument has
long been made that where there is strong state regulation as here,
there is a tendency to have rates entangled with politics." Never-
theless, in some ways the insurance companies collectively benefit.
The scheme, which includes compulsory liability insurance, creates
greater demand and this, in theory, promotes growth. But if there
is greater demand, there are also factors generating greater cost-
tendency toward more claims, the assigned risk plan,5" and greater
administrative costs because of complying with the regulations.
Thus, if these factors are present, then all, not only some, of the
insurance companies should share in this burden, i.e., by pooling
possible losses with the requirement of strict uniformity in rates. 51
Whether North Carolina's plan is of more benefit to the insured
than to the insurer is not readily discernible, but it can safely be
said that the plan does not effectively promote a significant level of
competition. The best result would be one that protects the policy-
holder while allowing a healthy degree of competition among the
"7 See HENSLEY, COMPET TION, REGULATION AND TEE PUBLIC INTEREST
IN NONLIFE INSURANCE 87 (1962) [hereinafter cited as HENSLEY]. For the
theory of rate-making, see ZOFFER 4-5. For the mechanics of rate-making,
see CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SocIETY, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE MAKING(1961).
8 However, this form of competition is largely ineffective because divi-
dend rates are uncertain, the buyer loses the use of his money during the
period between premium and dividend, and the seller dislikes this method
because it means increased costs. HENSLEY at 96. For an analysis of these
ways of competing, see O'CONNOR & DAUER, AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT
COMPETITIVE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLANS (1961).
" Although most states have financial responsibility laws, only three states
have compulsory liability insurance as a prerequisite to registration: Massa-
chusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § IA (Supp. 1965) and MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34A-J (1954); New York, VEHICL.E AND TRAFFIC LAW
§ 312 (1960); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (Supp. 1957). Of
these states, North Carolina and Massachusetts have laws requiring no
deviations from set rates. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 82
(E.D.N.C. 1965). Texas also prohibits deviation. Ibid.
0 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-276 (1953) provides for an "equitable apportion-
ment among such insurance carriers." Assigned risk is the granting of
insurance to those who otherwise would be uninsurable or whose rates
would be higher.
81 See S. REP. No. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1961).
[Vol. 45
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insurers.52 Alternatives to the plan in question seem closer to this
goal. For example, if rate deviation were allowed, competition
would be enhanced. 53 Solvency requirements could be established for
entry into the market to insure enough reserves for policy cover-
age." Assuming the argument that rating bureaus are necessary in
the nonlife field is still maintainable (life insurance companies have
legally established mortality tables to determine rates), the question
is whether compulsory bureaus are necessary.5 5 Most states have
non-compulsory bureaus and allow for deviation in rates. 6 And if
in fact such deviation still protects the solvency of the insurers and
does indeed promote competition, then the argument for non-com-
pulsory bureaus is persuasive.5 7 Even in this situation, insurance
companies are protected against rising costs because the market place
would provide for higher rates. Of course, scrutiny of this higher
price seems to be in the public interest. Whatever the alternatives
may, be, if insurance is to be regulated in regard to rates and sol-
vency, this should not be support for broad exemptions from laws
such as the Sherman Act which attempt to maintain competition.
Although the primary purpose of Congress was to return re-
sponsibility of insurance regulation to the states, the McCarran-
Ferguson Act expresses a congressional intention to keep the Sher-
man Act applicable. The real question is whether the federal policy
of competition promoted by the Sherman Act outweighs the policy
of allowing wide discretion by the states in their choice of devices to
regulate insurance. And viewed in this light, the court's decision is
perhaps all that one could expect since courts have generally shown a
" See Michels, Insurance-The Case Against Broad Exemptions From
the Antitrust Laws, 20 FED. B.J. 66, at 72-73 (1960); Dirlam & Stelzer at
211-15.
" The North Carolina plan did allow for deviation in rates until the law
was amended in 1961 by the present N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.2 (1965).
"' See HENsLEY 38-66.
" Contra, Brook, Public Interest and The Commissioners, 15 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 606 (1950).
"The majority of states permit independent filing of rates; other states
provide that companies must affiliate with a bureau and attempt to compete.
See HENsLEY 97. The bureaus spoken of are usually national, such as the
National Association of Independent Insurers, and provide the necessary
information for the setting of rates. See ZOFFER 72-73. For a listing of
states that have compulsory bureaus and standard rates set by the states in
regard to all fields of insurance, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp.
73, 82 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
"For an analysis of how effective rate-making is in the various states,
see S. REP. No. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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reluctance to allow federal "interference" with state regulation, the
underlying thought being that insurance is still basically a matter for
local regulation. Since Congress created uncertainties under the
act, Congress should remedy them.
WALLACE C. TYSER, JR.
Civil Procedure-Discovery of Liability Insurance
In the recent case of Cook v. Welty,1 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia held that the plaintiff, in an
action brought to recover damages for personal injuries arising out
of an automobile accident, should be granted discovery by deposi-
tion or interrogatories of the existence and coverage of defendant's
liability insurance.'
Federal courts, and state courts that have procedural rules similar
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are almost evenly divided
on whether automobile liability insurance is discoverable. This prob-
lem is relevant in North Carolina because a new code of civil pro-
cedure has been proposed by the General Statutes Commission and
will be considered by the 1967 North Carolina General Assembly.
3
Deposition and discovery under the Federal Rules are encom-
passed by Rules 26 to 37:4 Rule 26(b) delimits the scope of this
discovery.' It provides:
'253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966).
2Id. at 878.
* GENERAL STATUTES COMMISSION, PROPOSED NORTH CAROLINA RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1966), [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED RULES.] The
Proposed Rules are based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
correspond numerically to rules of the Federal Rules.
'FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
'Whether discovery is by deposition (FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 30), interrog-
atories (FED. R. CIv. P. 33), or by production of documents and things
for inspection, copying, or photographing (FED. R. Civ. P. 34), Rule 26(b)
delimits the scope of examination both in the Federal Rules and the Proposed
Rules for North Carolina. FED. R. Civ. P. 33-34 provide:
[RULE 33] Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be
inquired into under Rule 26(b)....
[RULE 34] the court . . . may . . . order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying . . . of any . . . docu-
ments . . . which constitute or contain evidence relating
to any of the matters within the scope of examination
permitted by Rule 26(b) ....
Welty involved a motion to compel defendant to respond to questions
asked while taking a deposition. It was stipulated by the parties that the
issue would also arise if interrogatories covering the same subject matter
had been served.
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